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The relation of private law to the state is one of the most complex aspects of the challenges
posed for the law by Europeanization and globalization. It is not only distinct from that between public law and the state; it is also not the same in different legal systems. This article
provides a historical and comparative overview of this relation in Germany and in the United
States. It analyses the historical conditions and reasons for which the state became the ultimate source of authority for private law in Europe but remained largely without importance
for doctrinal discussions and jurisprudential decisions within private law. It also identifies
some factors that can explain largely different developments in the United States, where, despite the conceptual absence of the state within private law, private law was never seen to the
same degree as autonomous from social policy. On the basis of these comparative and historical observations, the article concludes with more general, theoretical remarks on some of
the problems that may be seen as core aspects of the relation of private law and the state.
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Everyone is talking about the challenges that Europeanization and globalization pose for the
law, including private law. Yet there is remarkably little conceptual clarity about exactly what
these challenges consist of. To a significant degree, such developments appear to concern the
relation between private law and the state. Yet, although the general relation between law and
the state is a regular topic for legal theory, the specificities of private law are often lost. Even
cursory analysis suggests, however, that the relation of private law to the state is not only
highly complex and distinct, it is also, apparently, not the same in different legal systems.
Nevertheless, it has not yet been comprehensively analysed; in fact, little is known of how
private law relates to the state in any single legal system.
This article, together with a companion piece 1 , aims to shed light on some of the issues involved. Of course, the manifold relations between private law and the state are far too
complex to be analysed comprehensively in a single article, or even two. The primary aim of
these two articles is not to provide answers, but to raise questions that may stimulate further
discussion. Whereas the other article will structure and organize the fragmented debate in legal theory and comparative law on the impact of Europeanization and globalization, this article provides a historical and comparative background to the issues involved. Its first part identifies different perceptions of the relation of private law and the state in Germany and in the
United States in the 20th century. A second part turns to the earlier history of the relationship
of the state and private law. There, we examine, on the one hand, for which historical conditions and reasons the state became the ultimate source of authority for private law in Europe.
On the other hand, we ask why the state nevertheless remained largely irrelevant for doctrinal
discussions and jurisprudential decisions within private law. At the same time, we identify
factors that may explain the different developments in the United States and on the European
continent. On the basis of these comparative and historical observations, we conclude with
1

Michaels/Jansen, Private Law Beyond the State. Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization: American Journal of Comparative Law 55 (2007) xxx.
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more general, “theoretical” remarks on some of the problems that may be seen as core aspects
of the relation of private law and the state.

I.

Comparative Perceptions
1. European Perceptions: The State in the Background

During much of the 19th and 20th centuries, European scholars worked on two closely connected assumptions. One was that the validity of all law, including private law, ultimately depends exclusively on the state 2 . Nearly all private disputes discussed in academic literature
had been, or could have been, brought before the state’s courts, which applied, as a matter of
course, a state’s law. For most lawyers, this was neither a problem nor in any sense peculiar:
Was it not obvious that all law’s validity depended on the state? In fact, when Hans Kelsen
and Herbert Hart described the positive law’s validity and identity as conceptually depending
on a basic norm or a rule of recognition 3 and thus presupposing a sovereign’s authority 4 , they
gave expression to a common understanding. For most lawyers it was a matter of course that
such a sovereign could only be a national state 5 – be it represented by legislative or judicial
authorities.
The second assumption was that insofar as one looked at the substance of rules and
principles guiding the relations between private individuals (private law) 6 , it was largely irrelevant that the law’s validity depended on the state. Even if the state monopolised the administration of the law, private law in this sense was usually not seen as part of public governance, but as an expression of corrective justice that was largely autonomous of governmental decisionmaking. Codifications are normally written not by politicians but by legal experts;
2

See only Eugen Ehrlich, Internationales Privatrecht: Deutsche Rundschau 126 (1906) 419, 425: “Jetzt ist es
selbstverständlich nur der Staat, der bestimmt, welches Recht in seinen Gemarkungen gelten solle” (see
Michaels 1245 f.); Reinhard 281: “Recht ist heute von der Staatsgewalt monopolisiert”.
3
Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre2 (1960) 196 ff.; id., Pure Theory of Law (1967) 193 ff.; Herbert L.A. Hart,
The Concept of Law2 (1994) 100 ff. Note that both authors relativised the distinction between public and private
law: Kelsen, Rechtslehre, 284 ff.; id., Theory of Law, 281 f.; Hart, loc. cit., 27 ff.
4
Hart, Concept of Law (N. 3) 50 ff.
5
For a non-representative sample of authors from various traditions, see Klaus F. Röhl, Allgemeine Rechtslehre2
(2001) 184 ff., 186, 282 ff.; Dieter Grimm, Rechtsentstehung, in: id. (ed.), Einführung in das Recht2 (1991)
40 ff., 41: “Produkt staatlicher Entscheidung”; Johann Braun, Einführung in die Rechtswissenschaft2 (2001)
216 ff.; (critically,) Josef Esser, Grundsatz und Norm in der richterlichen Fortbildung des Privatrechts4 (1990)
337: “der rechtstheoretische Solipsismus der etatistischen Haltung entspricht völlig dem
Ausschließlichkeitsanspruch des politischen Positivismus”; Roberto M. Unger, Knowledge and Politics (1975)
281-284. For a succinct summary, see Edgar Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence (1940) 52 ff.
6
Of course, this statement presupposes a separable category of private law, which Kelsen, for example, denied:
Reine Rechtslehre (N. 3) 109 ff. For a more comprehensive discussion of the concept of private law in German
and American discourse, see Michaels/Jansen (N. 1) II.A.
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the great European codifications were much more a restatement meant to technically improve
the law 7 than a fundamental change of substance 8 . According to a classical view, basic principles of private law claim universal validity; and the state has no legitimate governmental interests in matters of private law 9 . Thus, the sovereign could be regarded as a neutral authority
to balance conflicting interests of two parties and to find solutions for conflicts that were regarded as purely private 10 .
This assumption was maintained even when the principles of corrective justice that
applied to such conflicts became an object of political controversy. Obviously, in such cases
modern states “intervened” into private law by means of (democratically legitimated) statutes;
strict liability and consumer protection are more recent examples of such instances of private
law becoming politically controversial. However, most private lawyers did not regard such
debates as more “political” than earlier doctrinal discussions concerning the laesio enormis 11
or culpa levissima 12 . Even if these conflicts were politically controversial and of significant
relevance for the economy and society, they all were understood by most lawyers 13 as concerning only purely private relations between private actors. Only exceptionally, when, in the
heyday of the nation state, the economic constitution of society was discussed on a strongly

7

Konrad Zweigert/Hein Kötz, Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung3 (1996) 78 ff., 84 ff. (for France), 137 ff.,
142 ff.; Paul Koschaker, Europa und das römische Recht4 (1966) 205 (for Germany). On the methodological
debate see Bernd Mertens, Gesetzgebungskunst im Zeitalter der Kodifikation (2004) 18 ff., 33 ff., 51 ff., further
references within.
8
See Zimmermann, Codification; Jansen, European Civil Code, in: Jan M. Smits (ed.), Elgar Encyclopedia of
Comparative Law (2006) 247 ff. Thus, Bernhard Windscheid had understood the German civil code as a “point
in the development” of the law (“ein Punkt in der Entwicklung”): Die geschichtliche Schule in der
Rechtswissenschaft (1878), in: id., Gesammelte Reden und Abhandlungen, ed. by Paul Oertmann (1904) 66,
75 f.; cf. also Gottlieb Planck, Zur Kritik des Entwurfes eines bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches für das Deutsche Reich:
Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 75 (1889) 327, 331 ff.
9
On further tensions between the national-state form of the private law and its non-positive, universal values see
Christian Joerges, Die Wissenschaft vom Privatrecht und der Nationalstaat, in: Dieter Simon (ed.), Rechtswissenschaft in der Bonner Republik (1994) 311 ff., whose focus is, however, on the tensions between the supposedly apolitical, formalistic understanding of private law, which may be attributed to the 18th and 19th century
German “Privatrechtsgesellschaft” and politically motivated changes during the 20th century. Here, the emphasis
is more on the shift from a corrective to an instrumental understanding of private law. It is not unlikely, that both
developments were intellectually closely connected.
10
See Philipp Heck, Grundriß des Schuldrechts (1929) 1 ff.; Ludwig Enneccerus/Heinrich Lehmann, Recht der
Schuldverhältnisse. Ein Lehrbuch14 (1954) 5 ff.; Ulrich Huber, Leistungsstörungen, vol. I (1999) 24 ff.; cf. also
Werner Flume, Allgemeiner Teil des Bürgerlichen Rechts II. Das Rechtsgeschäft3 (1974) 3 ff.
11
On contractual remedies because of some gross disproportionality in exchange cf. Zimmermann, Obligations
259 ff., 264 ff., further references within.
12
Quasi-strict liability for slightest fault, amounting to “negligence without fault”; see Jansen 340 ff., 433 ff.,
further references within.
13
But see, as exceptions, Victor Mataja, Das Recht des Schadensersatzes vom Standpunkt der Nationalökonomie
(Leipzig 1888): an economic analysis avant la lettre of extracontractual liability (cf. Izhak Englard, Victor Mataja’s
Liability for Damages from an Economic Viewpoint: A Centennial to an Ignored Economic Analysis of Tort: International Review of Law and Economics 10 [1990] 173 ff.); Karl Renner, Die Rechtsinstitute des Privatrechts und
ihre soziale Funktion. Ein Beitrag zur Kritik des bürgerlichen Rechts (1929/1965) 58 ff. and passim: a socioeconomic analysis of central institutes of private law, inspired by Marxist ideas. It is no coincidence that both works
have long been neglected by the dominant legal discourse.
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ideological basis, did private law become the object of regulatory considerations 14 . Yet these
discussions typically concerned only economic law, for only such “modern”, innovative parts
of private law were understood to especially shape and change the social reality 15 .
Accordingly, although influenced by changing or controversial social values, the traditional core areas of private law, such as the law of obligations, property and inheritance, were
not regarded as a means of promoting social change or furthering third-party interests and collective goals 16 . At least in Europe, these latter objectives were widely understood to be the
domain of public law; only in this domain was the state genuinely active in changing and
shaping society. Even the regimes of the Third Reich and the German Democratic Republic
soon gave up their (and their theorists’) far-reaching plans to socialize private law 17 and left
the structure of these core areas of private law largely in their traditional shape 18 . Private law

14

On the massive interventions into private law during the Republic of Weimar, see Knut W. Nörr, Zwischen
den Mühlsteinen. Eine Privatrechtsgeschichte der Weimarer Republik (1988) 3 ff. These interventions were
largely due to wartime economy viz. postwar economy. What is more, genuinely economic, instrumental
contributions, like Franz Böhm, Wettbewerb und Monopolkampf (1933) 187 ff., 210 ff., 318 ff.; id., Die
Ordnung der Wirtschaft als geschichtliche Aufgabe und rechtsschöpferische Leistung (1937) 54 ff.; more
reluctantly id., Privatrechtsgesellschaft und Marktwirtschaft: Ordo. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und
Gesellschaft 17 (1966) 75 ff., were not published before the Third Reich. For more legal contributions see
especially Walter Schmidt-Rimpler, Grundfragen einer Erneuerung des Vertragsrechts: Archiv für die
civilistische Praxis 147 (1941), 130 ff., 149 ff., 157 ff.; Walter Hallstein, Von der Sozialisierung des
Privatrechts: Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 102 (1942) 530 ff., 546 f.: the individual exercised
his rights as “Funktionär” or “Organ der Rechtsordnung”; id., Wiederherstellung des Privatrechts: Süddeutsche
Juristen-Zeitung 1946, 1, 6 f.; Ludwig Raiser, Wirtschaftsverfassung als Rechtsproblem, in: Festschrift Julius
von Gierke (1950) 181, 196 ff.; Ernst Steindorff, Politik des Gesetzes als Auslegungsmaßstab im
Wirtschaftsrecht, in: Gotthard Paulus (ed.), Festschrift Karl Larenz zum 70. Geburtstag (1973) 217 ff.; id.,
Wirtschaftsordnung und -steuerung durch Privatrecht?, in: Fritz Baur (ed.), Festschrift Ludwig Raiser (1974)
621 ff., and Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker, Über das Verhältnis des Rechts der Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen zum
Privatrecht: Archiv für die civilstische Praxis 168 (1968) 235, 237 ff.; cf. also id., Der Kampf ums Recht in der
offenen Gesellschaft: Rechtstheorie 20 (1989) 273, 281 ff. A survey of the discussion is given by Joerges,
Wissenschaft vom Privatrecht (N. 9) 324 ff.
15
K.W. Nörr, Zwischen den Mühlsteinen (N. 14) 16 ff., 42 ff.; Steindorff, Politik des Gesetzes (N. 14) 232 f. Accordingly, this debate was largely confined to economic jurists; it had no lasting impact on the general understanding of private law method – although the idea of economic law had been devised as a critique of exactly
this method; see Heinz-Dieter Assmann et al. (eds), Wirtschaftsrecht als Kritik des Privatrechts (1980); see most
recently Karsten Schmidt, Wirtschaftsrecht: Nagelprobe des Zivilrechts – Das Kartellrecht als Beispiel: Archiv
für die civilistische Praxis 206 (2006) 169 ff.
16
K.W. Nörr, Zwischen den Mühlsteinen (N. 14) 48 ff., 72 ff., 100 ff. Later, cf. especially Ludwig Raiser, Der
Gleichheitsgrundsatz im Privatrecht: Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handelsrecht 111 (1948) 75, 78 ff. Although
proceeding from the assumption that the principle of equality could have the function of achieving a certain state
of society (77) and despite arguing on the basis of arguments of Böhm, Eucken and Hallstein (93 ff.; cf. N. 14),
Raiser apparently understood these core areas of private law primarily as mirroring social life (77); accordingly,
he mostly argued as if private law concerned only the relations between two (or more) individuals (cf. esp. 88,
but see 95 f.). Some opposing views can be found in the Alternativkommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch
(1979 ff.); see also, e.g., Christian Joerges, Bereicherungsrecht als Wirtschaftsrecht. Eine Untersuchung zur
Entwicklung von Leistungs- und Eingriffskondiktion (1977).
17
Inga Markovits, Sozialistisches und bürgerliches Zivilrechtsdenken in der DDR (1969) 105 ff.; id., Civil Law
in East Germany – Its Development and Relation to Soviet Law and Ideology: Yale L.J. 78 (1968) 1, 35ff.; see
also Hans-Peter Haferkamp, Das Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch während des Nationalsozialismus und in der DDR mögliche Aspekte und Grenzen eines Vergleichs (2005).
18
This conflict between program and action has confused some scholars; see, e.g., Uwe Wesel, Geschichte des
Rechts (1997) 474 (“im Zivilrecht änderte sich einiges”), 475 (“Es änderte sich nicht viel”).
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changed its substance to a considerable (though as to its extent, disputed) degree, but these
changes were brought about largely as an interpretative reaction to assumed changed circumstances in society, not through intervention by and on account of the state 19 . The plans for a
“Volksgesetzbuch” failed 20 , and when East Germany finally adopted a new private-law codification in 1975, it looked very much like a modernized version of the old Civil Code 21 . Accordingly, when the law of obligations in West Germany became more “social” in the course
of the 20th century, the prevailing explanation was that the law had (more or less directly) responded to social and cultural change; apparently the state as such had no particular role to
play in such processes 22 .
Today, both of these assumptions have lost their self-evident character. As a matter of
fact, they offer an incomplete picture of the law in 19th and 20th century Europe. Private-law
rules could never be reduced to a fair balancing of the interests of individual parties in a legal
conflict: The ability to acquire bona fide the property of a third person or the question of how
to design the legal form of business enterprises has always been guided by the public interest
in a flourishing market 23 ; and the natural-law codifications were driven to a significant degree
by an impulse to further the common good 24 . Furthermore, private arbitration 25 and transnational customs of trade developing independently, without a legal basis in a specific state’s
law 26 , had existed long before the 19th century. But in the 20th century, scholars nonetheless
by and large did not accept transnational law as autonomous vis-à-vis national legal sys19

Prima facie, this thesis appears to differ from Bernd Rüthers, Die unbegrenzte Auslegung. Zum Wandel der
Privatrechtsordnung im Nationalsozialismus6 (2005) 114 ff. et passim, who emphasizes political influence on legal methods in the Third Reich as opposed to economic and social influences in the Weimar Republic. However,
the distinction is less sharp once we accept that, in a totalitarian state, what Rüthers calls “political” encompasses
economy and “the social”.
20
Gerd Brüggemeier, Oberstes Gesetz ist das Wohl des deutschen Volkes. Das Projekt des
„Volksgesetzbuches“: Juristenzeitung 1990, 24 ff.
21
For closer analysis, see Jörg Eckert/Hans Hattenhauer (eds), Das Zivilgesetzbuch der DDR vom 19. Juni 1975
(1995).
22
See Franz Wieacker, Das Sozialmodell der klassischen Privatrechtsgesetzbücher und die Entwicklung der
modernen Gesellschaft (1953) 18 ff.; Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, Wandlungen des Schuldvertragsrechts –
Tendenzen zu seiner Materialisierung: Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 200 (2000) 273 ff.: Both authors attribute changes within the traditional core areas of private law primarily to judges expressing changing social values,
not to interventions of the state.
23
Cf. David Mevius, Commentarii in Jus Lubecense Libri Quinque4 (Frankfurt and Leipzig 1700) pars III, tit. II,
art. II, n. 5, arguing that the institute of bona-fide acquisition had been introduced by statutory law – against the
principles of the ius commune – for public commercial interests: “Prospectum enim hâc in re est commerciorum
utilitati & securitati, cui Lubecensis Jurisprudentia contra merum jus laxè opitulatur, quia nempe ad summum
Reipublicae, cui Leges conduntur, pertineat”.
24
See infra at NN. 198 f.
25
Knut W. Nörr/Kerstin Schlecht, Zur Entwicklung der Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit in Deutschland: Gesetze und
Entwürfe des 19. Jahrhunderts, in: Vito Piergiovanni (ed.), From lex mercatoria to Commercial Law, Comparative Studies in Anglo-American and Continental Legal History (2005) 165, 166 ff.; Julian D.M. Lew, Achieving
the Dream: Autonomous Arbitration: Arbitration International 22 (2006) 179, 183 f.
26
Cf. Hans Großmann-Doerth, Der Jurist und das autonome Recht des Welthandels: Juristische
Wochenschrift 1929, 3447 ff.
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tems 27 . Moreover, and more importantly, most scholars writing on private law considered
such developments to be peripheral to what was understood to be private law.

2. American Perceptions: Instrumentalism without a State

Interestingly, the American legal system has experienced a remarkably different development.
On the one hand, even in the times of legal formalism, the distinction between public and private law was of less normative significance than on the European continent 28 . Today only
proponents of corrective-justice approaches to private law, such as Fried or Coleman 29 , explicitly argue for a sharp distinction of private and public law and explain private law as independent of public concerns. On the other hand, American judges had developed the law on the
basis of instrumental considerations as early as the beginning of the 19th century 30 ; and in the
20th century, as result of the legal realists’ critique of the private/public distinction as artificial 31 , it has been common for them to develop private law on the basis of public policy. It is
a matter of course for judges to understand private law as a means of achieving social ends.
Although there is wide disagreement over what these ends should be, there is fairly little
doubt that private law must be understood and evaluated in light of these ends. Indeed, even a
decision like Lochner v. U.S. 32 , now universally decried as an outburst of both judicial formalism and a false preference for an autonomous private sphere over valid public concern, is
really based on the weighing of public concerns – on the one hand “the interest of the state
that its population should be strong and robust” 33 , on the other “the ability of the laborer to
support himself and his family” 34 . Justice Holmes made clear that the decision concerned conflicting instrumental theories when he wrote, in dissent, that “a Constitution is not intended to
embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the

27

Cf. Francis A. Mann, Lex Facit Arbitrum, in: Pieter Sanders (ed.), International Arbitration. Liber Amicorum
for Martin Domke (1967) 157, 159: “In the legal sense no international commercial arbitration exists. … every
arbitration is a national arbitration, that is to say, subject to a specific system of national law”; today similarly
Christian von Bar/Peter Mankowski, Internationales Privatrecht2 (2003) § 2-75 ff.
28
John H. Merryman, The Public Law-Private Law Distinction in European and American Law: Journal of Public Law 17 (1963) 3 ff.; see also Michaels/Jansen (N. 1) II.A.
29
Cf. Charles Fried, Contract as Promise (1981); Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability: Journal of Legal Studies 2 (1973) 151 ff.; Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (1995); Arthur Ripstein, Equality, Responsibility, and the Law (1999); Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Principle (2001) 3 ff.
30
Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1780-1860 (1977) 1 ff., 17 ff.
31
Cf. Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1870-1960 (1992) 206; id., The History of the
Public/Private Distinction: University of Pennsylvania L.R. 130 (1982) 1423 ff.
32
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
33
Loc. cit. at 60.
34
Loc. cit. at 56.
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citizen to the state or of laissez faire” 35 .
However, whereas progressive legal realists and theoreticians of the New Deal connected these social ends explicitly with the state 36 , today these policies are apparently not derived from or connected with the political domination of the state. Instead, legal academia
and, to a lesser degree, the courts have bound themselves interdisciplinarily to other social
sciences, especially to economics, including public-choice- or game-theory 37 . Besides following precedent, judges are expected to implement moral norms based in and policies favoured
by society, and even when they make decisions based on official policies, they do so not because these policies are official but because they have the sufficient social support38 . Indeed,
it seems plausible that the common law in the United States, other than in continental Europe,
is thought of as based in society rather than in the state. Paradoxically, it appears that whereas
European private law is based on the state but not subordinated to the state’s instrumental
ends, private law in the United States is subordinated to such ends, but these ends (and the
law’s validity) are not found in the state.

3. Misperceptions? Transnational Private Law and State Instrumentalism

Recently, this paradoxical difference has changed fundamentally: On the one hand, the state is
apparently retreating from the legal system 39 . Thus, private lawmaking has become increasingly common, both within the national legal systems and on a transnational level, and in areas as diverse as labour law, accounting standards, good governance, and sport 40 . With the
rise of party autonomy in choice of law it has become usual business for parties to choose the
law they wish applied to their cases; thus the applicability of a nation’s law is subordinated to
a private choice. In a parallel development, national courts are regarded more and more as just
one option besides international arbitration, which since 1950 has gained an increasing degree

35

Loc. cit. at 75. See also Lawrence Friedman, American Law in the 20th Century (2002) 18: “In a sense,
Holmes and [the majority] saw eye to eye”.
36
Cf. Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State: Political Science Quarterly 38 (1923) 470 ff.; Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty: Cornell Law Quarterly 13 (1927) 8 ff.; id.,
The Basis of Contract: Harvard L.R. 46 (1933) 553, 585 ff.
37
Cf. Brian H. Bix, Law as an Autonomous Discipline, in: Peter Cane/Mark Tushnet (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies (2003) 975, 978 ff.
38
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Nature of the Common Law (1988) 28.
39
Philippe Nonet/Philip Selznick, Law and Society in Transition2 (2001) 102 f.
40
For a recent overview Johannes Köndgen, Privatisierung des Rechts: Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 206
(2006) 477, 479 ff.; cf. Jens Adolphsen, Eine lex sportiva für den internationalen Sport?, in: Carl-Heinz Witt et
al. (eds), Die Privatisierung des Privatrechts (Jahrbuch Junger Privatrechtswissenschaftler 2002) 281 ff.; id.,
Grenzen der internationalen Harmonisierung durch Übernahme internationaler privater Standards: RabelsZ 68
(2004) 154 ff.
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of autonomy from national legal systems 41 . Lawyers have started to act and think transnationally 42 . Thus, the intense debate about a modern “lex mercatoria” 43 may be understood as an
expression of the feeling of many of the participants that an international body of law or legally binding custom is emerging, in addition to and independent of the legal systems of national states 44 .
In a parallel development, legal scholars have begun discussing doctrinal problems
and systematic questions of private law as being independent of national legal systems 45 :
“Principles” of European and transnational law have emerged 46 ; they may be seen as an expression of the feeling that the foundations of private law can – or even should – be understood as independent of a nation’s laws 47 . Even judges are increasingly prepared to transgress
the national borders of their legal systems and accept foreign judgements or international
sources as authoritative. Much debate focuses on human-rights adjudication in which this is
now commonplace 48 ; in this context, a relevant factor may be the feeling among judges, or
41

Lew, Achieving the Dream (N. 25) 184 ff., 189 ff., 195 ff.
Cf. H. Patrick Glenn, A Transnational Concept of Law, in: Handbook of Legal Studies (N. 37) 839, 844 ff.;
Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Law, in: Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (N. 8) 738 ff.
43
Cf. Ursula Stein, Lex Mercatoria. Realität und Theorie (1995); for an analysis of the validity of such a body of
transnational rules and customs Michaels 1218 ff.; id., Privatautonomie und Privatrechtskodifikation. Zu Anwendbarkeit und Geltung allgemeiner Vertragsrechtsprinzipien: RabelsZ 62 (1998) 580, 601 ff., 614 ff. Defendants of the idea of a lex mercatoria include Clive M. Schmitthoff, Commercial Law in a Changing Economic
Climate2 (1981) 18 ff.; Jan H. Dalhuisen, Dalhuisen on International Commercial, Financial and Trade Law
(2000) 63 ff., 98 ff.; Hans-Joachim Mertens, Nichtlegislatorische Rechtsvereinheitlichung durch transnationales
Wirtschaftsrecht und Rechtsbegriff: RabelsZ 56 (1992) 219, 226 ff.; id., Lex Mercatoria: A Self-applying System Beyond National Law?, in: Gunther Teubner (ed.), Global Law Without a State (1997) 32 ff.; Köndgen, Privatisierung (N. 40) 501 f.; cf. also Klaus Peter Berger, Understanding International Commercial Arbitration, in:
id. (ed.), The Practice of Transnational Law (2000) 5 ff.; The Empirical and Theoretical Underpinnings of Law
Merchant: Chicago Journal of International Law 5 (2004) 1 ff. (Symposium Issue); Roy Goode, Commercial
Law in the Next Millenium (1998) 88 ff., tries to avoid the question; more critically, Filip De Ly, International
Business Law and Lex Mercatoria (1992) 207 ff.
44
Cf. Gunther Teubner, Globale Bukowina. Zur Emergenz eines transnationalen Rechtspluralismus:
Rechtshistorisches Journal 1996, 255, 264 ff.
45
Cf. Ernst Rabel, Das Recht des Warenkaufs, vol. I, (1936); Ernst von Caemmerer, Bereicherung und unerlaubte
Handlung, in: Hans Dölle (ed.), Festschrift Ernst Rabel, vol. I (1954) 333 ff.; Zimmermann, Obligations (1st ed.
1989); Hein Kötz, Europäisches Vertragsrecht, vol. I (1996). In France, similar ideas were expressed already at
the beginning of the 20th century: Christophe Jamin, Saleilles’ and Lambert’s Old Dream Revisited: American
Journal of Comparative Law 50 (2002) 701, 705 ff.
46
Ole Lando/Hugh Beale, Principles of European Contract Law, Part I/II (2000); Ole Lando/Eric Clive/André
Prüm/Reinhard Zimmermann, Principles of European Contract Law, Part III (2003); UNIDROIT (ed.), Principles
of International Commercial Contracts, 2004 (first 1994); see also Michael J. Bonell, An International Restatement of Contract Law3 (2005); European Group on Tort Law, Principles of European Tort Law. Text and Commentary (2005); Study Group on a European Civil Code/Christian von Bar, Principles of European Law. Benevolent Intervention in Another’s Affairs (PEL Ben. Int.) (2006).
47
Reinhard Zimmermann, Roman Law, Contemporary Law, European Law (2001) 107 ff.; id., Ius Commune
and the Principles of European Contract Law. Contemporary Renewal of an Old Idea, in: Hector MacQueen/Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), European Contract Law. Scots and South African Perspectives
(2006) 1 ff.; id., Comparative Law and the Europeanization of Private Law, in: Mathias Reimann/Reinhard
Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, 539, 563 ff.
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Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (2004) 65 ff.; Christopher McCrudden, A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights: Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 20
(2000) 499 ff., 506 ff., with an illuminating discussion of a range of conceptual, normative and theoretical prob42
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within their audiences, that human rights protect citizens against the state and should therefore
be understood as an autonomous body of non-state law that is developed and justified in
transnational discourse 49 . If similar developments can now increasingly be seen in private
law 50 , this suggests a possible, though implicit, similar assumption that private law emerges
from transnational discourse 51 .
On the other hand, state instrumentalism seems to be on the rise. In the United States,
the rise of regulatory statutes is deplored as an intrusion of the state into the common law 52 .
At the same time, the European Union (in this respect acting like a state) is more and more
adopting an “American”, instrumental approach to private law 53 : it increasingly uses privatelaw regulation for pursuing public goals. In consequence, the state becomes an “invisible
party” to legal proceedings between private individuals 54 . Consumer law is a telling example:
From a traditional perspective, as represented by Europe’s different national legal systems,
consumer law aims to protect “weak” consumers against dominant or even unfair business enterprises 55 ; such law is based on a corrective-justice approach to private law. Modern European directives on consumer law, by contrast, are drafted to create and protect a common
European market. They aim to further competition and trade and for this reason create convenient conditions for everybody to participate in this market 56 . Thus, they do not aim exclulems of this development: loc. cit., 510 ff.; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind”: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication: Cambridge L.J. 64 (2005)
575 ff. = Florida International University L.R. 1 (2006) 27 ff.; cf. also Angelika Nußberger, Wer zitiert wen? –
Zur Funktion von Zitaten bei der Herausbildung gemeineuropäischen Verfassungsrechts: Juristenzeitung
2006 763, 765 ff.
49
McCrudden, A Common Law of Human Rights? (N. 48) 527 ff.; Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium: Harvard L.R. 119 (2005) 129 ff.; cf. also Reinhard 25 f.
50
Examples are Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services, (2000) 1 A.C. 32 ff. (H.L.); for Germany,
Bundesgerichtshof, January 12, 2005, reference number: XII ZR 227/03 (BGHZ 162, 1, 7 f.); Walter Odersky,
Harmonisierende Auslegung und europäische Rechtskultur: Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 1994, 1 ff.;
Hein Kötz, Der Bundesgerichtshof und die Rechtsvergleichung, in: Claus-Wilhelm Canaris et al. (eds), 50 Jahre
Bundesgerichtshof, Festgabe aus der Wissenschaft, vol. II (2000) 825 ff. Cf. also, for Europe, Ilka Klöckner,
Grenzüberschreitende Bindung an zivilgerichtliche Präjudizien. Möglichkeiten und Grenzen im Europäischen
Rechtsraum und bei staatsvertraglich angelegter Rechtsvereinheitlichung (2006).
51
Cf., within the European context, Reinhard Zimmermann, Savigny’s Legacy: Legal History, Comparative
Law, and the Emergence of a European Science: Law Quarterly Review 112 (1996) 576 ff.; for a global (European-American) model, see James Gordley, Comparative Legal Research: Its Function in the Development of
Harmonized Law: American Journal of Comparative Law 43 (1995) 555 ff.
52
Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (1982) 1 ff.
53
On this approach cf. William W. Fisher III et al. (eds), American Legal Realism (1993) 167 ff., further references within.
54
The picture is taken from Berman 37. It may be an overstatement if Berman interprets such developments as
totally new: Society was already an “invisible party”, when the bona-fide-acquisition of property was invented
(supra at N. 23), or when the Roman aediles ordered the seller of slaves to inform buyers about all latent defects
(infra at NN. 86 f.). Thus, contrary to what Berman suggests, it is not sure that such developments will necessarily have a devastating effect on Western legal systems. On the theme of law’s demise, see also Steven Smith, The
(always) Imminent Death of the Law: San Diego L.R. 43 (2006) xxx.
55
Cf. Reinhard Zimmermann, The New German Law of Obligations (2005) 160 ff.
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Bettina Heiderhoff, Vertrauen versus Vertragsfreiheit im europäischen Verbrauchervertragsrecht: Zeitschrift
für Europäisches Privatrecht 2003, 769 ff.; ead., Gemeinschaftsprivatrecht (2005) 79 ff.; Caroline Meller-
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sively at balancing the interests of consumers and business enterprises. Instead, they utilize
individual consumer rights as instruments to advance a public or collective interest of welfare
maximization; they can be understood only from such an instrumentalist point of view.

4. State, Domination, and Instrumentalism

Prima vista, both developments run counter to each other, and they invite rethinking the role
of the state in private law and in private-law thinking: To which degree are fundamental concepts of private law shaped by, dependent on, and focussed on the state? Would it be possible,
or perhaps even desirable to detach private-law thinking from the state? From where could legal rules and arguments derive their legitimacy, if not from the state’s authority? These questions require clarifying the relation between state and private law.
The state as it is understood today is a modern concept. It is an abstract legal entity or,
more specifically, a juristic person dominating a people on a specific geographic part of the
world 57 . In this sense, it describes neither the Roman Republic nor ancient and medieval empires nor even the early monarchies in Sicily, England, France, or Spain. In fact, the concept
was coined only after the religious conflicts of the 16th and 17th centuries, when the traditional
monarchies were transformed into European nation states 58 . It was not until then that the state
was seen as an abstract entity independent of the monarch’s person, that it developed an extensive, complex administration monopolising the exercise of power, and that it gained immediate control of its citizens 59 . However, the modern state has not been the exclusive province of attempts to publicly control and administer private law. When reconstructing the modern relation between private law and the state, therefore, it may be more helpful to proceed
from the Weberian concept of legitimate domination (legitime Herrschaft) 60 . This is not to
say, of course, that the concept of the state is useless; to the contrary. “Domination” does not
fully describe the place of the state in modern private law. Thus, it does not account for the
fact that the modern state’s power and control are abstract rather than personal and that its
Hannich, Verbraucherschutz im Schuldvertragsrecht (2005) 59 ff., 67 ff., both with further references.
57
Cf. Georg Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre3 (1914) 174 ff., 180 ff.; van Crefeld 1; cf. also Reinhard 15 ff. In
substance, this conception of the state goes back to Hobbes; today it is widely acknowledged.
58
Cf. Alan Harding, Medieval Law and the Foundations of the State (2002) 295 ff., 307 ff.; van Crefeld esp.
124 ff.; Christoph Möllers, Staat als Argument (2000) 215 ff., further references within.
59
Before, central domination had always been mediated by independent intermediary powers; see Reinhard
196 ff., 212 ff.
60
Max Weber, Die drei Typen der legitimen Herrschaft, in: Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre7
(1988) 475 ff.; cf. also id., Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft5 (1972) 28 f., 122 ff.; for the English terminology id.,
Economy and Society, vol. I, ed. by Guenther Roth/Claus Wittich (1968) 53 f., 212 ff.: “domination” is different
from “power”, as it is defined “as the probability that … commands … will be obeyed by a given group of persons”; it is normally based on “the belief in legitimacy”.
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psychological role may go beyond “domination” in various ways. “Domination” nonetheless
yields specific insights for a historical perspective, since it not only identifies core aspects of
the modern relation between private law and the state, but it applies as well to other forms of
government, like chiefdoms, ancient city-states, or empires.
Yet the idea of “external” domination over private law is not simple and evident, but
complex and difficult to grasp: It presupposes a pre-existing field of private law onto which
the external actor is thrust, be it the official of the government of an ancient city, a sovereign
monarch, or the state. Thus it is assumed that private law can be thought of “prior to”, and independent, of such public authority. Private law in this sense is no more than the system of
rules guiding the relations between private individuals 61 . Now, domination can express itself
in two forms that are, at least conceptually, rather different. First, the external authority can be
seen as a disinterested and thus neutral sovereign or judge. In this case, private law continues
to be thought of as independent of any external – public or private – interest. Domination in
this sense expresses itself only in the monopolisation of the creation and administration of
private law; it is based on the external authority’s control over decisions within the field of
private law. In the second form of domination, the external authority can actively pursue some
external – individual or collective, private or public – interest by means of private law. Normatively, it thus becomes a third party to private transactions. An example is European consumer-law directives drafted to further the common market 62 .
Although both aspects of public domination over private law may come together, from
an analytical and – as will be shown – from a historical perspective, they are independent of
each other. On the one hand, full sovereignty may not be necessary for private law to be used
as a means for pursuing collective goals, and, on the other hand, a sovereign who has fully
monopolised private law may remain in a neutral, disinterested position. Thus, public domination over private law should not be equated conceptually with an instrumental, regulatory approach to the law. Instrumentalism and monopolisation of the law are independent aspects of
public domination and shall be treated as such in the analysis that follows. Thus, private law
may either be independent of any public domination, or it may be determined by some external dominator. Such domination may express itself either in the monopolisation of law creation and administration (to varying degrees), or in a political instrumentalisation of private
law, as contrasted with a non-instrumental, corrective-justice approach.

61
62

On the concept of private law see supra N. 6.
Supra at NN. 54 ff.
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II.

Historical Observations
1. Lawyers, Magistrates, and Emperors

Historical stories of private law typically start with Roman law 63 , and, indeed, Roman law is
probably the most important origin of the tradition of Western private-law thinking 64 . By contrast, the origins of the modern state’s administrating and controlling private law might more
adequately be traced to a much later stage, when the Catholic Church established itself as a
legally structured, hierarchically organised society and thus developed the modern ideas of
sovereignty and independent lawmaking 65 . The development of Roman law is particularly interesting precisely because of this temporal disjuncture: It provides a history of increasing
public domination over private law in the absence of a state in the modern sense. What is
more, although the ultimate outcome of this development, Justinian’s corpus iuris civilis was
established under imperial domination, it later became the point of reference for the ius commune—a tradition of legal learning, which conceived of private law as largely independent of
such domination or political authority.
Roman lawyers were normally reluctant to discuss abstract questions, like “sources” of
the law or even the relation between private law and public domination or government. They
were more interested in the discussion of concrete cases; theory was outside the scope of their
business 66 . Yet they had to know where to find the law, and here Gaius told Roman students
in the second century AD that it was preferable to speak of the laws of the Roman people in
the plural (iura populi Romani). These laws consisted not only of the statutes (leges), the
plebiscites, the Senate’s opinions (senatus consulta), the Emperor’s decisions (constitutiones
principium), and the edicts of the magistrates, but also of the opinions of legal scholars (responsa prudentium) 67 . Thus, different elements or “layers” of the law that had developed at
different times were meant to complement or even correct each other 68 ; accordingly, they
were conceived of as normatively independent of each other 69 . Hence, the law’s validity was
neither related to a “state” as such nor – at least until Justinian put the law into a new, com-
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This is true even in the common law (at least in England); cf. David Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the
Law of Obligations (1999) 6 ff.; Stroud F.C. Milsom, A Natural History of the Common Law (2003) 1 ff., 20 ff.
64
On finding and inventing “origins” in historical research see Jansen, “Tief ist der Brunnen der
Vergangenheit”. Funktion, Methode und Ausgangspunkt historischer Fragestellungen in der
Privatrechtsdogmatik: Zeitschrift für neuere Rechtsgeschichte 27 (2005) 202 ff.
65
Cf. Berman 4 f., 85 ff., 113 ff.; cf. also Reinhard 28, 186 f., 259 ff.
66
Cf. John P. Dawson, The Oracles of the Law (1968) 113 ff.; Schulz 70 ff., 146 ff.
67
Gaius, Institutiones, I,2; see Barry Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law (1969) 14 ff.
68
Cf. Papinian, D. 1,1,7,1.
69
Wieacker, Röm. Rechtsgeschichte 198 ff.
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prehensive corpus iuris 70 – to the general will of a “sovereign”. It was the product of different
and independent actors.
Such a plural system of legal sources may prima vista be explained by the fact that the
Roman jurists never really developed a modern concept of the state; conceptually the Roman
“state” was still identical with the Roman people (Populus Romanus) 71 . True, towards the end
of the Republic the Romans had come rather close to adopting the idea of a separated state 72 .
It was possible to speak of the res publicae Populi Romani, and the Populus Romanus could
as such acquire rights and duties; in fact, the magistrates acted for the Populus Romanus 73 ,
much as the prosecutor in today’s United States represents “the people”. Yet, in later times,
domination was attributed personally to the emperor, not to an abstract government of the
Populus Romanus 74 . Furthermore, even at the end of the Roman republic, Roman lawyers
proceeded from a plural conception of their legal sources, which adequately presented the law
as the product of different groups or actors within the legal system: Of course, the jurists believed that the XII Tables, the first Roman law and core of the ius civile, was a basic, integrative legal text for the Roman people as a whole 75 . But the senate’s opinions represented primarily the Roman nobilitas or the political establishment; conversely, the plebiscites had been
furnished with legal force in order to grant the plebs a balancing means of expressing its will
in legally binding form. Even more importantly, the law had long been administered and developed outside the government: Priests, not legislators, advised parties about the dates on
which to take legal actions or about the correct, effective formulation of legal proceedings,
last wills, or contracts 76 . Later, this tradition had been continued by private iuris consulti,
learned jurists, who devoted their lives to the law. Within a few centuries they developed a
specific legal language and transformed the still archaic law of the XII Tables into a highly
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Cf. D. Const. Tanta, 19: The texts of the corpus iuris, issued by the emperor Justinian, were meant to replace
all former law. Even Justinian, however, tried to legitimate his commands with the Roman tradition of legal
learning; cf. Inst. Const. Imperatoriam, 3 ff.; D. Const. Tanta, 13, 19, 21, 23 f.; see Schulz 359 f.
71
See Max Kaser, Das Römische Privatrecht, vol. I2 (1971) 304 f.
72
Cf. also van Crefeld 53 f.; see also Walter Eder, Der Bürger und sein Staat – der Staat und seine Büger, in: id.
(ed.), Staat und Staatlichkeit in der frühen römischen Republik (1988) 12 ff., and the other contributions to this
volume.
73
Wolfgang Kunkel/Roland Wittmann, Staatsordnung und Staatspraxis der Römischen Republik. Zweiter
Abschnitt. Die Magistratur (1995) 11 and passim.
74
Max Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht, vol. II2 (1975) 151 f. Now, the government acted as the fiscus Caesaris,
which originally had been the emperor’s personal assets, distinct from the res Populi Romani: id., Privatrecht I
(N. 71) 305 f.
75
“(F)ons omnis publici privatique … iuris”: Livius, Ab urbe condita, 3,34,6. Cf. also loc. cit., 3,31-57;
Jochen Bleicken, Lex Publica. Gesetz und Recht in der Römischen Republik (1975) 92 f.; Fögen 63 ff.;
Wieacker, Röm. Rechtsgeschichte 287 ff.
76
Wieacker, Röm. Rechtsgeschichte 310 ff., 551 ff.; see also Alfons Bürge, Römisches Privatrecht (1999) 87 ff.;
Fögen 127 ff.
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complex body of legal learning 77 based on methods of Hellenistic scholarship and remembered in voluminous textbooks. As result, at the end of the Republic this “privately produced”
lawyers’ law was largely independent of governmental domination and thus autonomous of
the political system 78 .
Nevertheless, the government had maintained means of controlling – loosely – the
law’s administration and influencing the law’s substantial development. Thus, the senate continued to issue senatus consulta, authoritative senatorial opinions that, though technically not
legislative acts, immediately became part of the legal system. A well-known example is the
senatus consultum Vellaeanum that for purposes of public policy prevented women from interceding 79 . Even more important was the magistrates’ control of the legal administration.
According to the rules of the formulary process 80 , the praetor or the aediles, high magistrates
in charge of the legal administration, were authorized to decide whether an action or exception was granted in a concrete case. Thus, they assumed a decisive role in the development of
the law’s substance by adopting new actions into their edicts, annually announcing the actions
and defences they were prepared to acknowledge.
These magistrates were high officials of the government, and they were clearly acting
as such. Even if most of them were probably unable individually to formulate the highly technical texts of their edicts and in this respect had to rely on professional advice of private iuris
consulti 81 , it would be wrong to infer that they were mere representatives or a “bridgehead” of
the legal community within the political sphere82 . Adopting a new formula and granting an
action remained governmental decisions, and many of these formulas expressed interventions
into the legal system based on public policy. Thus, the (modern) “aedilitian remedies” for defects of sold goods have grown out of an equally specific and pragmatic edict of the aediles,
which ordered the notoriously ill-reputed slave-traders to inform potential purchasers of any
illness or defect of the slave 83 . Every slave to be sold on the market had to wear a board on
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On the role of the learned jurists, see Ernest Metzger, Roman Judges, Case Law, and Principles of Procedure:
Law and History Review 22 (2004) 243, 251 ff. In fact, the iuris consulti may be seen as the main source of the
classical Roman law.
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Fögen 174 ff., 199 ff., 207 ff.
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D. 16,1; C. 4,29; Nov. 134,8; cf. Zimmermann, Obligations 145 ff.; Wolfgang Ernst, Interzession. Vom Verbot
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Interzedenten, in: Reinhard Zimmermann et al. (eds), Rechtsgeschichte und Privatrechtsdogmatik, 1999, 395,
397 ff.
80
On this Wieacker, Römische Rechtsgeschichte, 447 ff. with further references.
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Wieacker, Röm. Rechtsgeschichte 452 f.; Schulz 63; in detail, Fögen 190 ff.; Oliver M. Brupacher, Wider das
Richterkönigtum / A King of Judges?: Ancilla Iuris 2006, 107 ff.
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political function of the praetor within the legal system should not be neglected.
83
Ulpian, D. 21,1,1 pr.; see Zimmermann, Obligations 311 ff., further references within.
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which his defects were listed, and the seller was made liable if he violated this duty. The parallels to the European Union’s information requirements and individual rights of revocation 84
should be apparent: Political participants in the legal system use private-law instruments in
order to create a functioning market for the general public. Similarly, the habitator of a house,
a man who rented the whole block, letting different flats or rooms to other tenants, was made
strictly liable for damage caused by things thrown out of the building 85 . The prime purpose of
this praetorian actio de deiectis vel effusis was a public policy one – not fair compensation but
to fight the notoriously dangerous practice of throwing waste out of the windows of upper
floor flats 86 . The habitator was made liable independently of any personal fault 87 because he
was the only person who could possibly proceed against the bad habits of his tenants. And
when a freeman had been killed, the action was treated as an actio popularis, which meant
that everybody was entitled to claim the penalty for himself 88 .
Yet despite such political intervention into the legal system, and despite the formal
governmental control of the law’s administration, Roman law has become famous for the high
degree of autonomy from political government it had gained by the end of the Republic. In
fact, the praetors were never able to fully control the law’s development; to a large degree,
they simply acknowledged earlier developments within the privately developing legal system,
as expressed in the collective expertise of the iuris consulti 89 . This autonomy of the law resulted from its scholarly, self-referential development in the hands of iuris consulti, who were
both economically independent and not part of the political classes 90 .
Such autonomy was not acceptable for the emperors, who accordingly tried to take
control of the legal system. Thus, from early on, the emperors had allowed extraordinary appeals against decisions in the formulary process, and a new, “extraordinary” procedure administered by public servants (cognitio extra ordinem) came to replace the traditional formulary
process. Around 130 A.D., the emperor Hadrian entrusted the young lawyer Julian with the
formulation of an edictum perpetuum, a final version of the edict. Thus, the magistrates were

84
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Ulpian, D. 9,3; see Reinhard Zimmermann, Effusum vel deiectum, in: Dieter Medicus (ed.), Festschrift Hermann
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Ulpian, D. 9,3,1,4.
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no longer allowed, as before, to announce new forms of actions or legal exceptions on an annually new edict. Their constructive contribution to the law’s development came largely to an
end. Furthermore, already Augustus had tried to link influential iuris consulti with his political
administration 91 . They became high officials within the governmental system 92 ; since the end
of the second century AD, leading jurists were normally paid as public servants 93 . At this
time, the emperor’s legal office had become the centre of the legal system, which was increasingly seen as a homogenous body of norms, backed by the emperor’s authority 94 . Thereafter,
the law was developed by the emperor’s constitutiones and rescripta. Even if these were written by professional lawyers as a matter of course, the law was now dominated by the emperor’s governmental system.
The distinction between public and private law has been formulated already by Roman
lawyers 95 . However, this distinction was neither factually nor conceptually clearly drawn –
partly for the lack of the idea of a state that could represent the “public” side 96 , partly because
there was no developed administration, and partly because many of the functions of legal systems that are today understood as public responsibilities were fulfilled by private individuals.
Thus, magistrates would proceed against crimes only if they regarded these as a threat to the
populus Romanus as a whole; with crimes against individuals, the victims themselves had to
initiate legal proceedings against the wrongdoer 97 . Furthermore, many proceedings were
characterised by a mix of public and private interests; this was true not only for the criminal
iudicia publica, “public” proceedings, initiated and partly controlled by private individuals 98 ,
but likewise for the primarily “private” actio de deiectis vel effusis, which was regarded as an
actio popularis if a man had been killed 99 . And the actions against governors who unlawfully
exploited their provinces were step by step transformed from private actions into predomi-
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Fögen 200 ff., further references within.
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nantly public criminal proceedings 100 . Accordingly, it appears that Roman magistrates and
politicians never developed a feeling that public interests should be pursued only by means of
public law – in fact, there was no administration that could have fulfilled such duties. Instead,
the government acted on the basis of an instrumentalist conception of private law as a matter
of course. The aedilitian remedies, the actio de deiectis vel effusis, or the senatus consultum
Vellaeanum are telling examples of such a view of private law 101 ; and Augustus is famous for
his use of matrimonial law for population policy 102 . Papinian, one of the last “classical” jurists, even taught that the reasons for magistrates to intervene into the ius civile were always
based on public policy 103 . Yet, this was only shortly before the utilitas publica, a principle of
public utility, eroded all individual liberty or property and became the guiding measure of all
law under the absolutistic, personal domination of the late emperors 104 .
Instrumental considerations of this sort had usually not been present in the work of the
private iuris consulti of republican times; for them, “utilitas” normally referred to individual
utility 105 . Indeed, until the second half of the second century AD, when the legal profession
became part of the administration, these jurists had very little interest in matters of public
law 106 . Apparently, they proceeded from the intuitive assumption that the law concerned the
individual interests of Roman citizens. Thus, they tried to integrate the results of the government’s instrumental interventions into the traditional body of law; the aedilitian remedies 107
or the treatment of the senatus consultum Vellaeanum 108 are illuminating examples 109 . If such
100
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105
Thus, the individual “utility” of a contract, i.e. the question of whether a parties received a quid pro quo for
performing its duty or not, was relevant for the standard of care; cf. Dietrich Nörr, Die Entwicklung des
Utilitätsgedankens im römischen Haftungsrecht: Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte/Romanistische Abteilung 73 (1956) 68 ff.; Zimmermann, Obligations 198 f. And under the negotiorum
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106
Cf. Schulz 54 ff., 106 ff., 164 f.
107
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integration was not possible, the iuris consulti treated governmental commands as exceptions
based on some irregular consideration of public policy and binding only because of the magistrate’s or Emperor’s authority 110 . However, one would probably search in vain for explicit
statements in this respect; Roman private law was never based on anything like an elaborated
theory of corrective justice. Thus, it is still an open question, whether the lawyers’ abstraction
from public concerns was necessary for private law to become autonomous from governmental domination, or whether the concern for private interests and the sociological-institutional
autonomy of this lawyer’s law were parallel only by historical chance.

2. A Plural Legal World?

Although Roman law was based on a plural system of independent legal sources, from a procedural point of view, it was unified. As long as the praetor controlled the administration of
justice, a choice between different courts was excluded as a matter of principle. Likewise,
when the cognitio extra ordinem was later introduced as a procedure to acknowledge actions
that were regarded as desirable but that would have been refused by the praetor, this introduction did not really create two independent systems of private law. Rather, in the cognitio extra
ordinem the sovereign emperor was seen as modifying and further developing the republican
state of the law 111 ; the introduction of the new procedure signified a shift of the legal system’s
centre of authority from the praetor to the emperor.
In sharp contrast to such a model of a coherent legal system, legal historians have
drawn a totally different picture of the European legal order between the 12th and the 16th century 112 – a legal order said to bear significant similarities to the increasingly plural legal world
of our times that is characterised by conflicts between independent courts applying different

gestio is often understood instrumentally as a motivation for altruistic behaviour; cf. Jeroen Kortmann, Altruism
in Private Law (2005) 91 ff., 99 ff. Although this understanding can be traced back to Justinian’s Institutes
(3,27,1), the classical Roman lawyers did not think so. For them, the negotiorum gestio did not more than to acknowledge existing pre-legal social duties to help one’s friends (“officia amici”). Thus, there is no parallel to
Justinian’s formulation in the Institutes of Gaius; such an instrumental understanding was apparently not adequate before the private law had lost large parts of its autonomy. Cf., in more detail, Jansen, in:
Mathias Schmoeckel/Joachim Rückert/Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), Historisch-kritischer Kommentar zum
BGB, vol. III (to appear 2007) §§ 677-687, n. 9.
110
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50,17,141 pr.
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This is a central thesis in Berman 10 f., 199-519; similarly Paolo Grossi, L’ordine giuridico medievale (1996)
223 ff.; cf. also, for the 16th and 17th century, Peter Oestmann, Rechtsvielfalt vor Gericht (2002), who focuses,
however, on the special problems of secular law in the Holy Roman Empire that resulted from tensions between
different – written and unwritten – local laws and the ius commune.
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legal rules and principles 113 . Instead of a unified legal system, it is said, the old European order was a plurality of legal systems that conflicted with each other. Every individual was subject to the local statutes of the city or to the customs of the place where he lived; as far as private law was concerned, these local laws were embedded into the increasingly universal ius
commune 114 . At the same time, everybody was subject also to universal Canon law. The
Catholic Church claimed extensive general jurisdiction for all causae spirituales, matters then
regarded as inherently “spiritual”, such as family law (because marriage was a sacrament), the
law of succession, and even contract law (because contracts were typically confirmed by
oaths and the church claimed jurisdiction over pledges of faith) 115 . Furthermore, noblemen
were subject to feudal law, and peasants were subject to manorial law. Many artisans had to
obey to the local statutes and customs of their guilds, and merchants did their business according to a supposedly universal “lex mercatoria”.
Yet the degree of this pluralism should not be overestimated. Feudal law was quite
early integrated by legal scholars into the ius commune 116 . The most important source were
the Lombard libri feudorum of the 11th and 12th centuries that combined a restatement of customary feudal law with some important imperial enactments 117 . At the beginning of the 13th
century, this text had been included into Justinian’s Novels and thus became a part of the corpus iuris civilis. At the same time, feudal rights were explained in terms of quasi-Roman
property law (dominium directum and dominium utile) 118 . Thus, at least at this time, feudal
law could no longer be regarded as an independent legal system. Likewise, the guild’s statutes
were easily integrated into the legal systems of cities. What is more, the different local and
113
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cols. 1995 ff.
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droit savant: Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 66 (1998) 381 ff.; id., Dominium and ius in re aliena: The Origins of a Civil Law Distinction, in: Peter Birks (ed.), New Perspectives in the Roman Law of Property, Essays for
Barry Nicholas (1989) 111, 112 ff.; cf. also Maximiliane Kriechbaum, Actio, ius und dominium in den Rechtslehren
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territorial laws – customary or written – were expressions of the complex political order; their
relation was thus determined on a quasi-constitutional basis and by means of the theory of
statutes, a predecessor of modern private international law 119 . Accordingly, as long as claims
to jurisdiction were not politically contested, the multiplicity of legal sources did not necessarily result in genuine conflicts in the sense that independent courts would claim jurisdiction
for the same cases and apply different laws with divergent results. Thus, it might be misleading to describe this legal world in terms of a genuine pluralism of conflicting, independent legal systems; at least in theory 120 , it bore perhaps more similarity to an integrated federal system.
By contrast, the relation between Canon law and secular laws was far more complex

121

. Apart from jurisdiction over causae spirituales, there was a broad range of other

bases for the church’s jurisdiction 122 . In particular, the church claimed broad jurisdiction ratione personarum – not only over clerics, but also for travellers, members of universities,
Jews in disputes with Christians, and for miserabiles personae, such as children or widows 123 .
Attempts to clearly limit the provinces of Canon and secular law proved not very successful 124 ; in fact, quite often, even in criminal law, a matter was regarded as falling into a “mixed
forum”, a jurisdiction of both secular and ecclesiastical courts. Such cases might be decided
simply by the first court into which it was brought 125 . Additionally, however, the church also
claimed jurisdiction ex defectu iuris. Appeal against a secular court to an ecclesiastical court
was allowed if the secular judges had violated principles of justice 126 . Thus, genuine conflicts
of jurisdiction must have become a daily experience, and not only in unusual, international, or
politically contested cases.
In addition, even secular law exhibited a genuinely plural structure—at least if claims
that a lex mercatoria existed as an independent transnational system of commercial law are
119
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true. Yet, despite some treatises on a “lex Mercatoria” between the 13th and the 17th centuries 127 , whether such a system in fact existed is strongly disputed128 . The dispute is perhaps less
the historical matters of fact, however, than to their conceptually correct interpretation. In the
late middle ages, commercial cases normally fell into the jurisdiction of commercial courts.
These courts consisted typically of merchants, not professionally educated lawyers, and they
were largely, though not fully, independent of governmental or ecclesiastical control 129 . The
procedure displayed few formalities 130 ; and it was assumed that mercantile customs determined the relations between merchants 131 : Mercantile law was “thought to come from the
127
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market” 132 . But of course this did not mean that all relevant common and local law was excluded. To the contrary: The ius commune was normally the basis for decisions of the courts
of merchants; the common law was described as the “mother of mercantile law” 133 . Nevertheless, the ius commune was routinely modified according to the merchants’ needs; this is at
least how the learned lawyers perceived the matter 134 . A suitable device for achieving the desired results was the idea of mercantile equity (aequitas mercatoria), allowing exceptions to
the strict law 135 . Thus, in deviation from the Roman ius commune, merchants were not allowed to raise the exceptio nudi pacti, according to which a “naked”, unwritten, agreement
could not be enforced before a court 136 . Furthermore, in addition to different local and international customs and to the common law or ius commune, mercantile law was determined by
numerous written local sources: statutes of the guilds and towns, on both procedure and substantive law, and by privileges of towns or princes granting special rights to marketplaces and
to travelling merchants 137 .
Such findings are open to interpretation and debate: Did mercantile courts decide on
the basis of “law”, or was it just “equity”, based on customs? 138 What would have transformed commercial customs into genuine law? The modern answer, acknowledgement or incorporation by the state 139 , was not available because, even conceptually, there was no legal
monopoly before the modern state created one. For such customs to be regarded as law, would
it be enough for there to have been an acknowledgement that typical forms of contracts were
valid and could be used for interpreting incomplete agreements? Or would it rather be necessary that specific forms or contents of contracts were regarded as obligatory140 ? Parallels to
discussion about a modern “lex mercatoria” 141 are apparent. By contrast, another alleged
property of a modern lex mercatoria – its transnational character (i.e., absent “nations” in the
132
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modern sense, its independence of local polities) – finds no real parallel in history. If “transnational law” refers to a legal norms applied everywhere in the world, then mercantile law
was no such transnational law, since it was based primarily on the local customs and privileges of towns and fairs. Any “transnational” character consisted in a basic intellectual and
normative similarity, a similarity grounded in a common understanding of what commerce
was about and what was regarded as fair trade.
A final and perhaps more important question concerns the ambiguous idea of “independence” of legal systems. If independence presupposes an autonomous Grundnorm or a
“rule of recognition” 142 for the legal system in question, it becomes difficult to clearly classify
the lex mercatoria as “independent”, given the difficulty to situate its normative basis in the
market or in the common law. If, alternatively, independence presupposes that the relevant
norms, customs, and concepts constitute a complete “body of law” that is intellectually and
normatively independent of other legal systems and of non-legal systems of norms and belief,
lex mercatoria does not qualify, since it was based largely on the common law. If, finally,
“independence” is based on differences in substance, then not even Canon law would have
constituted an independent legal system, since it has always been assumed that Canon law
was based on the Roman ius commune (“Ecclesia vivit iure Romana”) 143 and on Christian
truth.
Apparently, “autonomy” and “independence” are classificatory alternatives; a legal
system is either independent or part of a wider system. Such an alternative might be insufficient or even misleading for understanding the late medieval legal order; perhaps it is more
appropriate to describe legal (sub)systems as more or less independent viz. more or less integrated. Then, the mercantile law might be viewed as more integrated into the ius commune
than was Canon law, but less than feudal law. Accordingly, the late medieval legal order
could perhaps be presented as a network of mutually connected, but not wholly integrated,
subsystems of the law. Such a picture would raise further, highly interesting, questions about
the concept of law and the idea of legal validity. Today, the law’s validity is typically explained monistically – integrated via the state’s authority 144 . In contrast, to describe medieval law it may be necessary to develop a genuinely plural conception of legal sources.
How did the lawyers and other legal decisionmakers of these days manage the uncertainty resulting from such relative independence of different legal subsystems? Answers to these questions may be helpful also for understanding more recent developments – not, of course, be142
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cause medieval concepts and instruments should be applied today, but because they could free
modern lawyers from the unconscious conceptual constraints that result from later developments 145 .

3. The “Lothar Legend”: Legal Authority and the Emperor’s Sovereignty

Commercial matters have at most times been brought before specific mercantile courts, and
merchants were typically a part of these courts. Nevertheless, since the 16th century these
courts were increasingly controlled by governmental authorities and became a component of
the public administration of justice 146 . At the same time, the mercantile law was integrated –
as the merchants’ ius singulare – into the learned ius commune 147 . Thus, institutions that had
developed among the merchants were now viewed as part of the common law. Apparently,
this was connected with the rise of the state as the sovereign source of (all) legal validity. Yet
it is an open question whether this integration should be interpreted as an active expansion of
governmental domination that expressed the states’ sovereignty or rather as an internal development within the legal system by which the actors of the law merchant themselves tried to
ensure legal certainty. It may have been an important issue for the merchants’ quasi-legal system to fix its boundaries from within by defining more clearly the distinction between legally
binding norms and mere conventions. This dichotomy reappears today when proponents of a
new lex mercatoria emphasize its autonomy from the state and the state’s laws and at the
same time advocate the duty of the state to adopt the lex mercatoria as valid “law” 148 .
Interestingly, similar developments were apparent in other parts of the medieval legal
world: If one had asked a jurist of the 14th century why the law merchant or the ius commune
were valid and what this might mean, his answer would probably not have satisfied a modern
lawyer. The jurist might have spoken of the grounds of legal authority, arguing that Canon
law was based on the authority of the Church and the Pope 149 ; that the municipal law of his
city was based on specific statutes on the one hand, and on privileges granted to the city by a
superior or mightier prince on the other; and that mercantile law was likewise based on privi145
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leges and custom.
The authority of Roman law was a different matter. Medieval lawyers treated the corpus iuris civilis as a “holy book” 150 : an eminent text containing eternal legal truth. In its revealed authority, it was put on the same level as the Holy Scripture and the classical philosophical texts of Plato and Aristotle (as far as these were known). Its authority resulted from an
idealised view on the Roman Empire as the cradle of European civilisation151 and from the
specifically juristic rationality inherent in its texts: it was “natural law historically confirmed
and metaphysically validated” 152 . However, it did not follow that Roman law was generally
applicable. At least in theory (though not always in practice 153 ), written municipal law had
priority, and the Roman ius commune was only of subsidiary applicability 154 . It was not so
much a set of rules applied uniformly before the courts than a common academic language.
Justinian’s Corpus iuris civilis was the authoritative textual point of reference of common juristic knowledge 155 . Accordingly, the validity of Roman law could not be explained on the basis of a concept of ideal, “natural” law. Natural law was a different concept; it did not refer to
a transcendental ideal, but to a loose bundle of binding, yet not always directly applicable
norms, such as the Decalogue 156 . At the same time, Roman law was also different from equity
(aequitas). This was a further, independent source of law based, again, on a different source
of legal authority; it has been seen in the treatment of mercantile custom 157 .
What is more, even if there is apparently little historic knowledge in this respect, the
different sources of legal authority may have been connected with different policies. Whereas
the Roman sources largely proceeded from an implicit corrective-justice approach to private
law 158 , medieval statutes were typically written for more instrumental considerations of public
policy. Accordingly, they did not provide for a comprehensive codification, but were limited
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to matters of particular importance for the social and commercial order of the community 159 .
Thus, quite different ideas and sources of legal authority or validity were present in the
legal world of the late Middle Ages. It followed that the authority of legal sources could only
be relative to that of others 160 . For contemporary lawyers, such a situation of uncertainty resulting from plural and relative authority cannot have been satisfactory. The conflicting authorities mutually qualified their respective authority161 and thus largely undermined the law’s
claim to finally determine normative conflicts. Apparently, a source of absolute legal authority was needed, a source to which all authority could be reduced; and here the idea of sovereign legislation, according to which all legal validity is based on the “will” of the sovereign,
may have come into play. Modern authors usually attribute this idea of sovereign legislation
to political writers 162 who developed the concept of the modern state in the 16th and 17th centuries, such as Jean Bodin 163 or Thomas Hobbes 164 . The emerging modern state, so the story
is told, took control over the law 165 , including private law, as part of its increasing immediate
domination over all its citizens 166 . A similar interpretation would be that the state’s legislative
authority was needed for solving fundamental problems of the legal system.
However, despite its plausibility at first sight, a couple of observations may raise some
doubts about this interpretation. First, legislation had long before been a means of sovereign
domination 167 . It is not a revolutionary thesis anymore that the Catholic Church became in
many respects the intellectual and institutional model for the later national states: Since the
11th century, the Popes used legislation both internally to construct the Church as a corporate
entity and externally to dominate the Christian world. In fact, this is where the idea of chang159
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ing, as opposed to describing or restating, the law by means of legislation was developed 168 .
City-republics with their statutes and early monarchic systems, like the Sicilian and the English, followed this example 169 . Thus, Aquinas could conceive of the law as an ordinatio, i.e. a
sovereign’s command 170 , and for Baldus a statute’s validity typically depended on a sovereign’s “Sic volo sic iubeo” 171 . So the idea that the law’s validity can be found in a sovereign’s
command cannot have been new in the 16th century. What was new was to describe the (national) state’s sovereignty in terms of unlimited legislative competence. But this was not directly relevant for the conceptions of positive law or for legal authority and validity.
Second, at the end of the 15th century – before there was a developed conception of the
modern state – scholars had attributed the validity of all secular law 172 , and thus also the validity of the Roman ius commune, to the Emperor’s command. In 1135, so they told, Lothar III of Supplinburg had prescribed the use of the recently found Digest 173 . Remarkably,
this story was an ex post invention that served to legitimise the use of Roman law. The modern idea of the authority of private law’s being based on sovereign domination was in fact first
developed by legal scholars as a fiction. Apparently, the results of this attribution were complex: By constructing an ultimate source of authority outside the legal system that had long
before become incapable of being a dominant actor in matters of private law, the attribution
preserved the autonomy and the growing influence of the Roman ius commune, as “administered” by legal academia. While purporting to interpret governmental commands, legal scholars continued to develop the law largely independently of governmental or judicial influence.
Yet, despite the central place of the state in modern concepts of law, neither the motives for
this fiction nor its consequences have been fully analysed. Instead, since the 17th century, the
controversial debates of the reception as such of Roman law 174 have put this problem into the
shadow. But the modern relation of private law to the state cannot be understood without a
168
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clear picture of the factors that led to the idea that legal validity could derive only from external domination and thus from the sovereign, the ultimate secular authority.
Finally, even in the 16th and 17th centuries, the sovereign monarchs or cities did not
exhibit a particular interest in comprehensively determining the law. True, they had reduced
the impact of Canon law and had monopolised the judiciary175 . And an increasing number of
statutes was issued regulating matters of public policy 176 . But this legislation concerned
mostly matters of public law 177 ; and – apart from criminal law 178 – there was no comprehensive, codificatory legislation until the 18th century 179 . Private law continued to be based on the
Roman texts of the ius commune and on local statutes. Thus, the appearance of the state was
arguably irrelevant for the substance of private law and even preserved the private law’s
autonomy.

4. Sovereignty and Validity I: Codification and the State
Over the course of the 17th century, the validity of the law had become a fundamental problem
for the legal system. On the one hand, the story of Emperor Lothar III’s having enacted the
Digest as positive law was irrelevant outside the borders of the German Empire. In 1643 it
was buried as a “legend” in Germany as well, when Hermann Conring published his book
“De origine iuris germanici”. On the other hand, the validity of the applicable “positive” law
was now becoming more and more closely connected with a sovereign’s will. In the 18th century, even customary law was reconceptualized as law tacitly agreed on, and thereby made
valid, by the sovereign 180 . This led to the paradoxical and unsatisfactory situation that although the validity of law could depend only on the sovereign’s command, the most important
175
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part of private law had never been enacted by any competent legislator. Accordingly, it became difficult to justify the validity of the corpus iuris civilis on the basis of the prevailing
conception of law as based on legislative fiat 181 . In fact, the Roman ius commune has been
characterised as having been remarkably detached from the state’s governmental domination 182 . Nevertheless, during the 18th century, Roman law was taught as a matter of course at
the universities; and the courts applied it pragmatically183 . More theoretical authors justified it
on the basis of totally divergent arguments, such as imperium (a prince’s tacit confirmation of
the prevailing judicial practice), the traditional usus of Roman law, or its inherently legal
qualities (ratio and certitudo). None of these arguments was regarded as really satisfactory by
the jurists themselves 184 .
Moreover, Conring did not write his refutation of the Lothar Legend as a disinterested
scholar. He fought – successfully – for the acknowledgement of a genuine German legal history and German private law 185 ; and he even argued for a new comprehensive legal basis (a
“codification” 186 ) of German private law 187 . Thus, on the one hand, the received Roman law
was increasingly discredited as “foreign”, and the concept of private law became, for the first
time, intellectually connected with the idea of a nation. This idea of situating law in the nation
was later deeply entrenched in European legal thinking, when Montesquieu published his De
l’Esprit des lois in the 18th century, and when Savigny’s idea of the law being an emanation of
the common “consciousness” or “spirit” of the people (Volksgeist) became a central element
of the 19th century German Historic School. Similar ideas circulated at this time in the English
common law. On the other hand, the writers of the later usus modernus regarded customary,
law as a source of law, even if it was not laid down in a written text 188 . As a consequence, the
question of which law was applicable became even more difficult, and legal proceedings suffered from extreme uncertainty about the applicable law 189 .
It was only at this stage that European legislators appeared on the scene and actively
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extended their sovereignty into the domain of private law. On the continent, private law was,
within a remarkably short period, comprehensively codified 190 . Thus, it is prima vista highly
plausible to regard codifications as an expression of the “strong state” 191 . Indeed, codifications were initiated by the governmental administration and thus originated in the political
sphere. Interestingly, they were first successful only in strong states; but the form of government was irrespective for the codification projects: The law was codified in the stilltraditional absolutist kingdoms of Sweden (1734) and Bavaria (1756), by the more enlightened Prussian King (1794) and the Austrian Emperor (1811), and by the bourgeois postrevolutionary government of France (1804). From a conceptual point of view, by reformulating the private law as an expression of the sovereign state’s legislative intent, the law was incorporated into the state.
Nevertheless, codifications have also been described as “a specific historical phenomenon that originated in … legal science” 192 . In fact, it is remarkable that common-law
systems have proved strongly resistant to codification 193 . Therefore, in order to understand the
role of the state in the codification movement, it is necessary to look to the motives leading to
codification that were apparently manifold and complex. The first was a mixture of pragmatic
and theoretical considerations. The whole legal system was in need of fundamental reform
and of a unified legislative foundation, not only because the present plural and insecure state
of the law was highly unsatisfactory, but also because the normative status of Roman law as a
source of positive law had become untenably awkward. This was partly due to the second factor – the (assumed) need to rationally reorder and systematise private law. In fact, in the increasingly rationalistic world of 18th century, Roman law lost its previous status as legal ratio
scripta that had long been a major rationale for its application: Reason had to be simple and
evident for every clear mind, but Roman law and the civilian legal science were complex and
full of apparently unnecessary controversy. Reason had to express itself in general propositions, i.e. abstract laws, but the digest was full of the subtle discussions of individual cases.
Already in the 17th century, this had been a motive for humanist and natural-law scholars to
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rearrange and rationalise the traditional private law into new systems of legal order 194 ; thus,
Leibniz had proposed an ideal codification that could logically reorder civil law 195 .
What is more, rationality and the idea of a system had become the foundation of natural-law thinking. In the 17th and 18th centuries, authors like Grotius, Pufendorf, Thomasius,
Heineccius, and Wolff had transformed the traditional Christian school of natural law into a
secular enterprise. Assuming that moral and legal truths are accessible for human reason, they
developed logical, conceptually structured systems of natural law on the basis of a limited
number of basic moral principles. Thus, the systematic structure of the law had become much
more than a device of expository convenience. It was a matter of moral principle.
Although these natural-law systems were not thought to be directly applicable, they
proved highly influential in continental Europe, where they became a driving force in the
codification movement. The idea of codifying the law appealed to enlightened princes and to
the new bourgeoisie, and not only because such a codification would emphasize the crown’s
sovereignty and the new state’s identity 196 in the area of private law and because it would
make the law accessible to everybody 197 : Another, possibly decisive, factor was apparently
the instrumental, utilitarian character of this secular natural law, which was based on clear visions of a better, reasonable social order. Accordingly, a comprehensive and systematic reorganisation of the law in a natural-law codification promised to further the common good and
bring about a better, more enlightened society 198 : The natural-law codifications were ultimately based on a reformative, instrumental view of private law 199 . Thus, they were initially
drafted primarily not by legal elites, such as academic scholars or judges, but by philosophically and politically educated representatives of administration200 . (Of course, these draftsmen
knew a lot of positive law; the codifications would not have been comprehensible had they
194
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not been based largely on traditional Roman law). Nevertheless, to trace and identify both the
foundations and the results of this instrumental approach should provide important insights
into the idea of codification and into the relation of private law to the state.
All in all, the codification idea was originally motivated by a bundle of highly divergent factors. What is more, it was in the 19th and 20th centuries connected with new political
values, especially with the democratic ideal of the law as an expression of a people’s will. It is
doubtful, though, whether any of these moral ideals has ever been achieved: First, codifications today are not written by legislators and often not even by administrations, but by commissions of scholars and other legal experts. A democratic legitimization of the codification
idea may therefore be regarded as artificial. In fact, even today the codification idea appears
to be still connected with the natural-law intuition that the law can be “found” or “constructed” by abstract legal thinking (and therefore needs no democratic consent). Accordingly,
it is reported by participants that current proposals for new “principles” of European law are
occasionally written before the comparative research had been done 201 . Second, codifications
have never made the law accessible to laymen outside the legal system. Even if the myth is
true that every Frenchman used to carry his Code Civil with him, it is unlikely he understood
it. In fact, already the enlightenment’s legislators proceeded from the assumption that additional instruments were needed to make the codified law known by the general public 202 . And
finally, even the more reformatory codifications did not fundamentally change the law: One
of the main aims of codification has always been to restate the law simply 203 ; accordingly, the
courts have mostly just continued earlier lines of jurisprudence 204 . The legal system has thus
retained large parts of its autonomy. Of course, governments influence the development of
private law by means of legislative intervention; this has been seen above with respect to the
European Union’s directives and the Roman magistrates 205 . But codification has never fully
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shifted the development of private law from judges and scholars to the government. It follows
that – as long as the judiciary is not conceived of as one aspect of a homogenous, metaphysical state 206 – private law may be seen as largely independent of the state even today, despite
its formal incorporation into the state by means of codification.
This brings us back to the initial question of the relation of the state and the legal system in the codification process. If this question is answered from a more formal perspective, it
might appear decisive that the codifications replaced the plural legal sources of the late usus
modernus by a single state law; the codification movement would thus be described as a process of the states’ expanding their domination into traditionally autonomous areas of the legal
system 207 . However, codification might likewise be understood as a primarily internal legal
process by which an external source of legal validity is established without the legal system’s
giving up its internal autonomy. Seen from this internal perspective, the state might perhaps
not have meant much more for the legal system of the European nation state than did the Roman praetor for the Roman republic 208 . However, the exact historical relation of internal legal
and external political factors has not yet been sufficiently analysed. Such analysis is necessary
not only for a complete picture of the historic development but also for understanding the relation of the state and private law today. A comparison of the different developments in continental European and in the common-law world might well help with this analysis.

5. Sovereignty and Validity II: the People and the Common Law

Even today, the relation between the state and private law appears to be significantly closer on
the European continent than in the common law. This may be due not least to the common
law’s having always remained in the hands of judges who developed a high degree of independence from the state and a strong collective professional identity. Although the courts had
everywhere become a part of the centralised administration of the state (or, in England, of the
crown), the judiciary had – in varying degrees – retained some sort of independence against
the political government 209 . Even where the courts enjoyed no formal, constitutional independence 210 , judges were able to protect individuals against absolutistic arbitrariness211 . They
206
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formed a self-recruiting professional elite and could thus develop specific values and a specific idea of law. Accordingly, they can often be placed “between” the state and the legal system 212 . Thus the roles of judges on the one hand and of government on the other may be crucial to the relation of private law and the state and so deserve special attention. The independence of judges – normative or factual – entails limits of governmental sovereignty 213 .
Nevertheless, to draw a simple distinction between the “codified” civil law and the uncodified common law and to relate this distinction to the difference in the state’s position in
private law may be too simplistic. First, it is wrong to describe the common law as intrinsically averse to codification. Civil lawyers will probably know that the concept “codification”
was coined by Jeremy Bentham 214 , but there is less awareness of the many codification discussions in England, in the Commonwealth, and in the USA. The codification debate in England is as old as that on the continent 215 , and from the 19th century onwards 216 , these discussions were no less intense than those on the continent 217 . They resulted only exceptionally in
civil codes, however, most notably in British India 218 and in Louisiana 219 . Instead, there are
different, specifically American outcomes of the codification debate, namely the restatements
and the UCC, both of which have created a substantial degree of national uniformity and systematization of the law. In contrast to European codifications, however, the restatements were
initiated as a non-state enterprise 220 and have retained this status until today 221 . Thus, a comVerwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit im 19. Jahrhundert, in: Jürgen Kocka (ed.), Bürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert, vol. I
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parison of the divergent codification processes on the European continent and in America is
specifically helpful for understanding the relation of private law and the state.
Basically, the reasons offered for codification in England and America were similar to
those in continental Europe 222 . It was argued that a codification would make the law more accessible and structure it in a rational way; its application would thus become efficient. Influential lawyers, especially Bentham, emphasised the function of a codification to promote social change towards a better society 223 . Furthermore, codes could have been seen as an expression of the American revolution; indeed, such arguments seem to have been important in
early codification attempts in 17th century Massachusetts 224 . Why then, it might be asked,
were these arguments ultimately less successful in the United States?
Standard answers are that codifications were regarded as unsatisfactorily inflexible;
often the quality of a proposal was argued to be low. Common lawyers had always mistrusted
the parliament and its legislative ability. Parliamentarians were opposed to social change. Politically influential lawyers were likewise conservative, and they may have had political interests in preserving the present state of law that was the basis of their professional identity and
livelihood 225 . But the inflexibility of codes has not prevented European legislators from codifying the law even in the 20th century, and lawyers were no less conservative and selfinterested in civil jurisdictions than in English and American ones. Other reasons for the success of the codification-movement on the European continent and not in the common law may
have been more decisive.
A first reason is apparently that neither the English nor the American legal order was
plural in the same degree and sense that made the peoples on the European continent suffer
from legal uncertainty226 . The differences between law and equity, between admiralty law and
common law, were real, but probably less pressing than the differences among legal sources
in Europe. Second, the prevailing common law was never seen as an alien, foreign system, as
was the case with the Roman ius commune in the 17th century. In England and America, there
was never an emotional distance from the prevailing legal system. To the contrary: Common
lawyers identified with the common law 227 ; and the sharp attacks against the common law by
222
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Bentham, the leading proponent of codification in England, may in turn have resulted in a
fundamental distrust of the codification movement as a whole 228 . Interestingly, identification
with the common law also happened in the United States, where, from around 1800, American common law was perceived not as a received body of alien English law, but as the customary law of the American people 229 .
Connected with this observation is, third, the different role of judges on the European
continent and in the common-law world that might have accounted for the different attitudes
towards legislation. Whereas the French revolution used codification as a governmental bulwark to protect the people from a corrupt judiciary 230 , the objective in the common-law world
was to protect the people through the courts from a corrupt government. The same desire for
democracy and liberty may thus have turned into an argument for codification on the continent and against it in England and the United States and so ultimately provided a significant
difference in the respective relationships between private law and the state.
For the present analysis, a fourth factor may be the most interesting one: The common
law’s legal validity was always thought of as independent of the state 231 . This may seem
doubtful for England, where the common law was developed by the common-law courts that
in turn derived their authority from the King 232 , and the King was actively engaged in the
law’s development by the introduction of remedies in equity by the King’s Court of Chancery 233 . Yet, even if the common-law courts derived their authority from the King, the law
they applied was thought to be found rather than made, and to bind the King, as well 234 : To
overcome the law, the King had to resort a body of rules outside law, namely equity.
In any event, when the United States rejected the sovereignty of the English Crown,
the common law they received was thereby stripped of such foundation in the will of the
(English) Crown. American lawyers apparently never felt another positive source of law was
needed for lack of the common law’s legal authority. This is not to say questions of the law’s
validity were not raised. To the contrary: In a remarkable historical parallel to the civilian development 235 in America in the 17th and 18th centuries, the validity of customary law was related to the sovereign’s will. Yet, as far as we know, this created neither conceptual nor prac228
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tical problems. Arguably, the reason it did not was that sovereignty was not attached to an abstract state but to the American people, whose consent was seen as essential not only to the
Constitution (“We, the People”), but also to the common law, understood as customary law
based on consent and formulated by the courts as representatives of the people 236 . There was
simply no need to introduce an abstract state; government and the legislator had no necessary
role to play in the development of private law. When Justice Story declared, in 1842, that federal courts sitting in diversity could develop a federal common law rather than the commonlaw rules of different states 237 , he did so based on the idea of a national (and even transnational) common law (invoking ideas of lex mercatoria) that required no formal sovereign,
whether state or federal, for its validity. It would take almost one hundred years until this idea
of a private law grounded in neither the states nor in the federal government was found to be a
“brooding omnipresence in the sky” 238 and dismissed 239 . Yet even this dismissal was not so
much a state-positivist attack against the idea that the common law derives its validity from
society rather than from the state; it was an attack only against the idea that the relevant society was a national or even transnational society rather than one of each individual state 240 .
This feature of the American concept of private law became particularly significant in
the debate about the New York civil code 241 . Here, James Coolidge Carter, the major opponent of the code project, relied on arguments very similar to those of Savigny in opposing a
German Civil Code at the beginning of the 19th century. Apart from criticising the code as a
poorly drafted misrepresentation of the present law of New York, he opposed, on a more fundamental level, the very idea of a codification itself. Carter argued that law was “an original,
but ever growing body of custom” that reflected “the national standard of justice” and “public
opinion”. This was largely equivalent to Savigny’s idea of the law’s being an emanation of the
236
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common “consciousness” or “spirit” of the people (Volksgeist). The only difference appears to
have been that the Volksgeist had been expressed by scholars, while the “national standards of
justice” were now collected in the precedents of the common law 242 . Yet, as Mathias Reimann
has observed 243 , this idea was much more congenial with the American legal mind and its
original common-law tradition than to the German legal culture that was based on “foreign”
Roman law and that had long regarded the state as the legal sovereign. Thus, whereas Savigny
ultimately limited his argument to the claim that German law was not yet ripe for codification
(and indeed such Codification did come about later), Carter had no such grounds to qualify
his argument, and the New York codification project ultimately failed.
This defeat is today regarded as a crucial event within the development of legislative
codification in American 244 . A desire to authoritatively systematise and unify the law, however, has remained. It found a different expression in the restatements. As a purely private enterprise, these left the authority of the common law untouched. At the same time, they were
conceptually and factually open for the law’s development. They did not claim to authoritatively fix the law, but, less pretentiously, to reconstruct it with an authoritative text. As result,
it was natural for the restatements to get out of date. They are periodically reformulated and
thereby – substantially and systematically – adapted to the changes of the law 245 .
All in all, different concepts of sovereignty are arguably one basic reason for the different role of the state in modern private law. Yet the idea of private law’s being based on a
sovereign people’s will or consciousness is perhaps even more a fiction than the concept of a
state comprehensively dominating the law. It served to defend, on the one hand, the law’s
autonomy and, on the other hand, the interests of the elites of learned lawyers 246 . It is thus an
interesting question, why, at some stage of Western legal history, a general consensus developed that the law conceptually needed some external source of authority, called sovereign. At
any rate, the consequences of introducing such an external sovereign were complex: Conceptually, this amounted to a loss of the autonomy of private law. Yet, originally such an introduction of a sovereign was a fiction that helped preserve the factual autonomy of private law.
Only in more recent times, it may, perhaps ironically, have paved the way also for a factual
loss of autonomy. As a matter of fact, in the course of the last 150 years, the state has become
more and more active within private law; and in view of the state’s legal monopoly, it is diffi242
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cult to criticise such development. Today, legislation pervades private law in the United
States, as well 247 . Only now, it appears that sovereignty over private law is shifting from the
people to the state.

6. The State, Society, and the Public/Private Distinction

Modern writers reconstructing the development of the distinction between private and public
law typically proceed from a political understanding of the public/private divide. They understand the idea of an autonomous private law as representing specific liberal (or libertarian 248 )
values such as individual autonomy, freedom of contract, and an absolute concept of property.
According to this theory, the bourgeois society constituted itself against the increasingly powerful state in the 18th and 19th century 249 . Liberal writers argued that private law was immune
to governmental intervention; only the realm of public law was open to political decisionmaking. In matters of private law, the legislator was restricted to describing a supposedly neutral, apolitical “natural” law based on historically developed principles of justice 250 . The division became entrenched in the legal system only as result of a certain political debate, when
liberals sought to protect “society” against an increasingly dominant “state” 251 .
Of course, this theory is highly plausible and contains an important truth: The distinction was indeed politicized in this sense; and the earlier secular natural law had often assumed
an instrumental understanding of private law 252 . Furthermore, this theory may help to explain
the different approaches of the common and the civil law towards the public/private divide. In
England, the bourgeois establishment had achieved participation in the government as result
of the Glorious Revolution; it did not need a sphere of immunity against the government 253 .
Indeed, whereas German thinkers traditionally conceived of the state as an independent entity
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with abstract value in itself (Hegel) 254 , the Anglo-American world saw the state simply as the
product of society without an independent being or intrinsic value 255 .
Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether this is the complete story. On the one hand, there
may be more mundane reasons for the sharp divide in Germany, in particular the fact that different courts are competent for administrative and private matters. Since the 17th century, the
state’s administrative acts had increasingly been regarded as immune to judicial review; this
development culminated 1806, when – as result of the end of the Holy Roman Empire – individuals lost their traditional constitutional protection against local governments 256 . Thus the
judicial review of administrative acts had to be newly established, leading to specific administrative courts 257 . This institutional separation probably entrenched the academic division of
public and private law as fundamentally different subjects – a division that had resulted from
the fact that, after the 16th century, the constitutional frame of the Holy Roman Empire had to
be developed independently of the Roman sources, which continued to be the point of reference for private law 258 . As result, even today, it would be impossible in Germany to hold a
chair for administrative law and torts. An academic teacher is expected to be either a public or
a private lawyer. All in all, there are strong sociological reasons for the sharp divide between
public and private law thinking in Germany that on the one hand put the division beyond
question and, on the other hand, prevented private lawyers from seeing private law as a means
of public concerns.
On the other hand, the thesis that politics and the state were behind the distinction is
doubtful in view of its pedigree. The distinction was present in Roman law without a comparable political implication 259 . Of course, the distinction had lost much of its relevance as long
as European societies were largely feudal. Under the feudal system, the king did not directly
dominate his people: Domination was mediated by intermediate vassals, and feudal relations
were based on the ideals of voluntary consent and reciprocity 260 . These relations relied on
principles of corrective justice; in fact, domination was legally conceived of in terms of prop254
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erty (dominium) 261 and thus in notions of private law, to which the public/private distinction
was unsuited 262 . The difference between an individual’s power over his possessions and the
prince’s power over his vassals and subjects was only a matter of degree 263 .
Yet these feudal structures of the European society began to vanish before the state
and the idea of a homogenous society, as opposed to the state, appeared on the scene. As early
as the 14th and 15th centuries, the first monarchies had developed in Sicily and in England as
forms of direct domination between the prince and his subjects 264 . Apparently in response to
these developments, it was soon generally recognised that different principles applied to such
relations on the one hand and to relations among citizens on the other. This awareness is apparent in discussions of the distinction between distributive and corrective justice. Although
this distinction had been authoritatively stated by Aristotle and Aquinas, neither referred to
different social relations 265 . As far as we know, it was only Cardinal Cajetan, a leading representative of the late scholastic school of Salamanca, who in 1518 reconstructed this distinction as representing vertical and horizontal social relations. Whereas corrective justice guided
the relations among citizens, principles of distributive justice were directed at a person representing the “whole” (society, or the state) distributing social benefits and burdens among its
“parts” (citizens, or subjects). Conversely, the “parts” were guided by the principles of legal
justice (iustitia legalis): the obligation to obey the law 266 . This was an expression of the intuition that sovereign domination makes a fundamental difference from a normative, legal point
of view: Different principles apply to the public and to the private sphere. Within few years,
and before the modern concept of a state 267 and the idea of a private society had been developed, this transformation of the Aristotelian doctrine had become generally accepted 268 , and it
has continued to determine all future discussions and legislation 269 .
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Accordingly, although secular natural lawyers often proceeded from an instrumental
view into private law, they clearly separated it from public law. Thus, Pufendorf, in his “De
iure naturae et gentium” first treats private relations in the status naturalis – such as tort, contract, and property law 270 – then proceeds to private relations of domination 271 , before concluding with public 272 and administrative law 273 . Apparently he regarded the different areas of
the law as sufficiently distinctive to deserve separate treatment. The instrumental concept of
private law does not make its specific foundation in corrective justice irrelevant. Private liability for negligence is justified on the basis of a preventive, penal consideration that will reappear much later in the economic analysis of law: Without such liability, citizens would not
refrain from selfishly causing damage to each other 274 . But Pufendorf neither proposed an alternative to the law of delict nor equated it with criminal law.
At the same time, Pufendorf did not think that private law should be immune to public
regulation. Many questions of private law were not finally determined by natural law and
were therefore left to the sovereign’s discretion 275 . Thus, a full understanding of the idea of
private law as autonomous against public intervention requires tracing the equating of private
law with the (equally fundamental) intuition of Western lawyers, held by civil and common
lawyers (albeit in different ways) that certain principles of the law are beyond governmental
discretion 276 . At any rate, a full understanding of the public/private-divide will be enhanced if
its different historical layers of normative meaning are disentangled.
What is more, independently of any political argument, such as defending society
against the state, the distinction between corrective and distributive justice may be a sufficiently important from a normative point of view, to retain the distinction between public and
private law. True, private relations can never finally be determined without distributive considerations of public policy 277 : The law of tort/delict distributively assigns protected interests
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and determines the extent of individual responsibility (strict liability vs. liability for fault) 278 .
Contract law distributively decides for all citizens of a legal order which interests should be
protected against other citizens. But such distributions concern bipolar relations that are normatively structured by corrective justice. They are different from distributions like those of
tax law that are independent of such bipolarity. It might therefore be too rash to discredit this
distinction altogether as politically conservative.

III.

Concluding Remarks

All in all, these observations show that from a historical point of view, many questions regarding the relation between the state and private law are still open. Much of the historical
genesis of this relation is unknown or open to debate. At the same time, even if it is not possible to draw “conclusions” from historic analysis, these observations may shed new light on
more basic, conceptual and normative questions that arise as result of the developments described in the introduction.

1. Sovereignty, Validity, and Authority

The historical survey has shown that the idea of basing the validity of private law on some external sovereign was always somewhat fictional: Neither the American people nor the continental European states, as represented by governments, could ever comprehensively control
the private law’s development. Besides government, academics and judges remained important actors. Thus it might be possible to conceive of legitimate private law without roots in
external sovereignty. Indeed, basing all validity monistically in one sovereign is perhaps not
very helpful when the law becomes transnational; 279 such a concept is of limited usefor conflicts between different national and transnational legal systems.
Now, private law without a state may be seen simply as a kind of natural law280 . Indeed, this idea is again present in the debate of a lex mercatoria 281 and among the proponents
of a European civil code 282 . Yet, for a new natural-law approach, more would be needed than
a somewhat naïve belief in eternal legal values; and even if the idea of natural law does not
278
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depend on some external sovereign 283 , natural law lacks the positivity which is also indispensable for transnational law 284 . Thus, older concepts related to the pluralism of legal sources
and authorities may be more helpful for understanding and dealing with the modern complex
state of the law. Here, contemporary legal theory has developed different concepts of validity 285 – legal validity, ethical validity, and social validity – relating them to different standpoints: to the internal interpretative point of view, to the superior moral point of view, and to
the external descriptive point of view 286 . Historical experience, however, indicates that such
standpoints can be combined. Thus, the idea of the law’s authority may be a suitable instrument for describing the difficult questions, whether transnational sources could or should be
used for solving a legal conflict. This concept allows for degrees and for a combination of different standpoints. It may thus complement the monistic concept of legal validity. However,
to make the still-vague idea of “legal authority” a useful legal instrument would require further analysis.

2. Justifying Policy: Democracy and Reason

This first conceptual problem of legal validity or authority becomes more practical when
normative questions are the object of debate. It is common knowledge today that private law
implies far-reaching decisions of policy: Simply speaking, private law may be more or less
liberal or social. This is seen as one of the fundamental reasons for an authoritative, governmental codification of private law on the one hand 287 , and for challenges to the legitimacy of
transnational, global law, on the other 288 . This debate presumes that government is able to determine the development of private law, but history shows this presumption to be doubtful.
Codifications are not drafted by the political legislator, and they have proved unable to determine the law’s future development. Private law has kept a significant degree of autonomy,
even when it has been codified. Thus, to acknowledge the autonomy of transnational or judi-
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cially made private law may in fact present fewer new problems than is commonly assumed.
On the one hand, the states’ governments maintain the option to intervene into such law; on
the other, if it is simply not possible to justify private-law policy by means of governmental
representation, it may be more promising to look for adequate forms of legal reasoning, for
transparency of decisionmaking, and for other forms of (discursive) participation of those affected by a decision. Transnational discourse and consent may be seen as an adequate form of
justification and thus as a source of legal authority and legitimacy 289 .

3. Systematising Private Law

Codifications structurally changed the nature of systematic and doctrinal legal reasoning. As
long as the authoritative texts of a legal system do not presuppose an explicit or implicit system, as was the case in Europe before the codifications 290 and still is today in the commonlaw jurisdictions 291 , systematic thinking may be constructive, innovative, and thus open to revision. Under such conditions, systems are brought to the law “from the outside” 292 . More recently, such an approach has been presupposed by the American restatements and by enterprises to formulate transnational doctrinal systems as a basis for comparative law293 . As long
as the different national systems exhibit sufficient similarities in substance, then, it may, in
principle, be possible to formulate such systems transnationally 294 .
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Systematic thinking within a codified legal order, however, aims at finding and, at
best, developing an authoritatively imposed system within the law 295 ; it is part of the applicative hermeneutic process of interpreting a sovereign legislator’s command 296 . Accordingly,
codifications tend to ossify the systematic assumption of the times of their enactment and thus
may become an obstacle to adequately describe the law’s development over time. Although
individual legal rules can be changed (relatively) easily by legislation or by judicial development 297 , to replace a traditional legal system with a new one has proved difficult and often
even impossible. As a natural consequence, tensions emerge between the codification’s implied systematic structure and the changing values and rules. Thus, the systematic assumptions implicit in codifications may create serious problems for legal reasoning and for the judicial development of the law 298 .
If the law should remain responsive to such a change of values, or if such change is inevitable (as the history of codified law suggests) 299 , it may be preferable to leave the task of
system-building to academia and limit the legal competences of democratically legitimated
legislative bodies to normative decisionmaking. In the end, the questions of how to formulate
doctrine and systems should be decided by more “scholarly” criteria intrinsic to the law – like
technical precision, adequacy, and internal coherence; these criteria are largely independent of
political authority. In this way, juristic knowledge could again become independent of national legal systems; the development of a European jurisprudence formulating “principles” of
European law 300 can be seen as a step into this direction 301 .

4. Conclusion
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These are questions not for the past but for the present and for the future; they are questions
central to debates of Europeanization and globalization. Yet this article has shown, on the one
hand, that these questions are the result of a specific historical development: There is no
“naturally given” relation between private law and the state. On the other hand, it has become
apparent that these questions are not simply the fruit of totally new tensions between private
law and the state, either. Similar questions have occupied the minds of lawyers for centuries.
Accordingly, the article has shown a couple of answers given in the long and winding history
of German and US law. Obviously, these answers cannot simply be copied; our period is different from those that came before it. At the same time, to ignore these debates in answering
the questions of our time would mean to dispense with centuries of experience that we have
with these, or similar, questions. Even more importantly, our modern questions are often not
fully understood if they are not seen as resulting from specific, partially contingent historical
developments. If this article has succeeded in making this historical background of the modern debates more accessible, it has served its aims.
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